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Intelligence operations are as old as politics itself. After all, 
states gather intelligence to understand the capabilities and 
intentions of others, to inform policy decisions and diplomatic 
initiatives, and to identify threats before they can attack. States 
do not restrict intelligence collection to enemies, potential or ac-
tual. They also spy on their allies. For one, states need to under-
stand whether their security partners are willing and able to fulfil 
their commitments in case a crisis with their common adversary 
breaks out. For another, they need to watch for signs that their 
allies might be planning risky adventures.  Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) engage in intelligence col-
lection for all of these reasons. Though they watch each other, 
they cooperate so as to improve deterrence of shared threats and 
to strengthen political ties. States also do counter-intelligence — 
operations that protect against espionage and other intelligence 
activities undertaken by friends and foes alike. States often do 
not want to show their hand and so they try to misrepresent their 
capabilities, interests, and vulnerabilities.2
The Russian disinformation campaign makes it harder for NATO 
to achieve such ends by complicating intelligence and counter-
intelligence missions.3  Aiming to confuse and to sow distrust 
among Western governments, the Kremlin’s disinformation cam-
paign has consisted of disseminating its preferred narratives 
through media outlets, Internet trolling, cultivating friendly popu-
lists in Western Europe, and manipulating complex ethnic griev-
ances. Such activities increase the burden on agencies engaged 
in intelligence and counterintelligence. To be sure, the Kremlin 
did not discover the value of mounting disinformation campaigns 
just recently—the Soviet Union had engaged in similar activities 
over its lifespan.4  What perhaps distinguishes current efforts 
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from past disinformation campaigns is the underlying technol-
ogy. The Internet and other advances in telecommunications 
have made it easier and quicker to spread bad information in 
the public sphere.
Western European countries rely on intelligence 
to collect information on the capabilities and 
intentions of friends and foes alike. They also 
perform counter-intelligence missions in order 
to hinder the intelligence operations of oth-
ers. This policy brief highlights how the Russian 
disinformation campaign strives to enhance 
Russian deterrence of unfavourable policy re-
sponses to its foreign policy actions. It also illus-
trates how it affects intelligence and counter-
intelligence missions undertaken by Western 
European countries in at least two ways. The 
first involves increasing the so-called noise-to-
signal ratio via the dissemination of preferred 
narratives through media outlets, Internet troll-
ing on social media, the cultivation of friendly 
populists in Western Europe, and the manipu-
lation of complex ethnic grievances in Eastern 
Europe. The second involves creating potential, 
and exploiting existing, barriers to cooperation 
between national intelligence agencies via 
the use of Edward Snowden, WikiLeaks, and its 
potential violations of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Western European 
countries must deepen their cooperation in or-
der to prevent Russia from being successful in 
its divisiveness.
Western Intelligence and 
Counter-intelligence in a Time of 
Russian Disinformation 
2I argue that the Russian disinformation campaign largely 
serves to deter an unfavourable policy response from NATO 
members. Because it is militarily and politically weak relative to 
the combined strength of NATO, Russia resorts to such means 
in order to create ambiguity over its true capabilities and in-
tentions. Such is partly how Russia practices deterrence.5  It 
relies on this form of information warfare to keep adversaries 
both off-balance and self-deterred from responding to Russian 
actions.6  In so doing, the Russian disinformation campaign 
adversely affects intelligence and counter-intelligence among 
Western European countries in at least two ways. The first 
is that Russia is creating more noise that drowns out clean 
signals that could indicate its intentions and capabilities. The 
second is that Russia is striving to generate distrust between 
western intelligence communities. Thus, the Russian disinfor-
mation campaign is an offensive form of counter-intelligence 
insofar as entails operations outside of Russia.
Increasing the Noise-to-Signal Ratio
The first pathway through which Russian disinformation com-
plicates intelligence and counter-intelligence operations is by 
polluting the information environment with too much noise. 
The task of intelligence is to separate signal from noise—
that is, relevant pieces of information from irrelevant ones. 
Although organisational pathologies and human frailties can 
compound such problems, an adversary could engage in a pro-
gramme of deception to obscure signals so that they would 
have multiple, even conflicting meanings.7  Deception can take 
different forms that include the issuing of deliberately false 
public statements, the use of military and political decoys, and 
the dissemination of those narratives that reflect certain preju-
dices.
The last of these forms of deception is where Russia has 
shown much visible effort. Using diverse platforms like state-
sponsored news outlets (e.g. RT and Sputnik International) 
and social media like Twitter, the Russian disinformation cam-
paign has promoted a particular interpretation of connected 
events alongside a set of beliefs about existing political insti-
tutions that suits its interests. For example, Russia has ac-
cordingly sought to shape public opinion in Sweden over that 
country’s relationship with NATO.8  The resulting narrative as-
serts the legitimacy of Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria 
while undermining that of western policies and politicians.
Of course, western intelligence agencies do not depend on RT, 
Sputnik, and Facebook to gather intelligence. Nevertheless, 
what confounds observers is how the substance of this dis-
information campaign often overlaps with the platforms and 
policy proposals of certain Western European political parties. 
Consider the growth of populism in the region. Partly because 
of rising economic inequality, many voters in Western democ-
racies have come to distrust those politicians whom they per-
ceive as careerist, corrupt, and aloof from their concerns. Such 
disaffected voters gravitate to those politicians who promise 
to satisfy majoritarian needs at the expense of economic 
elites and the so-called political establishment. As the Brex-
it vote in Britain indicates, this sort of populism has already 
influenced public policy even if mainstream political parties 
remain in power. Such populism might reflect genuine and per-
haps justifiable political dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, West-
ern European populists often call for economic protectionism 
and disengagement from NATO, while expressing sympathy 
for authoritarian leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
Some political parties like Front National in France have even 
benefited from Kremlin support, whether financially, diplomati-
cally, or both.9  Briefly put, it has become unclear whether pro-
Kremlin narratives and expressions of interests in Western 
Europe have genuine indigenous roots or reflect adversarial 
counter-intelligence operations.
This aspect of the disinformation campaign is arguably the 
most direct and intrusive, but Russia has also used subtler 
means to increase the noise-to-signal ratio. When Russia 
was still asserting political control over Crimea, the Kremlin 
claimed that local forces were driving the annexation effort. 
For example, the so-called ‘little green men’ obstructed efforts 
to identify their provenance and connection to the Russian 
military. Indeed, Russia could claim with some credibility that 
Russian-language populations in Crimea and other parts of 
Ukraine needed protection against the depredations of the new 
government in Kiev. Given the cultural affinity that those popu-
lations might have with Russia, it was difficult to determine 
the extent to which events were driven by local or by external 
forces.10  Similarly, Moscow undertook a major deception pro-
gramme following the shooting-down of MH17 over eastern 
Ukraine. It claimed that Ukrainian forces were responsible in 
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prosecuting its war against rebel groups—an accusation later 
refuted by studies commissioned by the Dutch government.11
The result is that intelligence agencies and other state authori-
ties must devote a share of their resources to debunk false 
narratives, to identify trolling trends, and to expose informa-
tion manipulation. The Swedish Security Service had to deal 
with such a matter when social media users circulated letters 
sent from the Swedish Ministry of Defense about armed ex-
ports to Ukraine that later turned out to be forgeries. Norwe-
gian intelligence agencies have similarly flagged Russian dis-
information as a major issue of concern.12
Creating and Exploiting Barriers to Cooperation
The second pathway through which Russian disinformation 
complicates intelligence and counter-intelligence operations 
involves creating potential barriers to cooperation between 
national agencies. Western European governments coordinate 
some of their intelligence efforts, sharing pieces of intelligence 
in order to exploit economies of scale and to understand the 
intentions and capabilities of shared adversaries to the best 
extent possible. Such is the purpose of Five Eyes (FVEY)—of 
which the United Kingdom is the only European member—and 
NATO’s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 
By monitoring communications of potential sources of threat, 
these organisations complement national capabilities in es-
pionage and intelligence processing in addition to providing a 
formal structure for how member governments share secrets 
and intelligence amongst themselves.
Russia has stepped up activities designed to sow discord 
between (and within) national intelligence communities. The 
most commonly known tactic involves the use of individuals 
such as Edward Snowden. In order to collect information on 
adversaries, intelligence agencies recruit contacts who will 
obtain for them classified documents from within a target 
organisation. In the case of Snowden, whether he was a na-
ive idealist campaigning for transparent governance or a spy 
knowingly working on behalf of Moscow is moot. Snowden 
performed this role for the Russian intelligence, intentionally 
or not.13  His theft and disclosure of a massive trove of docu-
ments exposed global surveillance programmes operated 
by the National Security Administration (NSA) in the United 
States with the support of telecommunication companies and 
other western governments. Not only did these documents re-
veal intelligence capabilities, but they also embarrassed West-
ern European governments when secret domestic surveillance 
programmes came to light. The embarrassment intensified 
once media outlets began reporting on how allied govern-
ments were spying on each other.14  Though the substance 
of Snowden’s revelations was not disinformation per se, they 
similarly served to deepen distrust in political institutions and 
to provide further ammunition for populists to criticise main-
stream political parties.15
How did these revelations affect Western intelligence organi-
sations? It is hard to say because powerful incentives for them 
to cooperate still exist. Nevertheless, Western European gov-
ernments had to admit their complicity following pressure to 
dismantle those surveillance programmes. The outrage was 
palpable in France and Germany that the NSA was collecting 
extensive information on French and German citizens, particu-
larly because the security benefits of such surveillance efforts 
were unclear. Moreover, contacts or sources who relied on their 
anonymity were suddenly put at risk when their names ap-
peared in documents leaked by Snowden and even WikiLeaks, 
an international organisation that specialises in procuring and 
spreading classified or secret information.16  Existing practic-
es needed changing, for better or for worse, because the politi-
cal pressure was too much for business to continue as usual. 
Whether those changes are cosmetic is unclear due to the na-
ture of the enterprise. Disclosures of mutual espionage could 
not but put governments on the defensive. Snowden’s actions 
had the potential of placing those organisations tasked with 
intelligence and counter-intelligence functions—missions im-
portant for tackling disinformation—in disrepute.
Interestingly, we have already observed Russia undertake 
questionable activities that NATO cannot properly address due 
to barriers in intelligence cooperation. These activities involve 
possible violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty. Signed between the United States and Russia, this 
international agreement banned all ground-launched cruise 
missiles and associated launchers that have short (500-1000 
kilometres) and long (1000-5500 kilometres) ranges, be they 
conventional or nuclear. Putin has long complained that the 
INF Treaty does not serve Russian interests, partly because 
of American-led initiatives to develop a missile defense sys-
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tem in Eastern Europe.17  However, only in the last few years 
has Russia tested weapon-systems that might be in violation of 
the agreement—the R-500, the 9K720 Iskander launcher, and an 
intercontinental ballistic missile called the RS-26 that could hit 
targets within the proscribed range.18  Despite making charges 
about certain Russian weapon tests, the United States has been 
reluctant to supply firm evidence of wrongdoing.19  One hypoth-
esis is that it and other FVEY members do not want to share, let 
alone publicise, the relevant intelligence with Western European 
countries, lest FVEY capabilities become compromised.20  Rus-
sia can thus continue denying that it is breaking its INF commit-
ments, while making counter-allegations that the United States 
is in breach of the treaty with the placement of a missile de-
fence launch system in East Central Europe. Western European 
governments (and publics) have to take the United States at its 
word about Russian non-compliance. Indeed, to counter oppor-
tunistic violations of the INF Treaty by Russia, it is now even 
more imperative that FVEY and non-FVEY intelligence organisa-
tions find ways to cooperate.
Counter-intelligence as Deterrence
The current disinformation campaign belongs to a larger tradi-
tion in Russian counter-intelligence history of using subversion 
and prejudiced narratives to create divisions among Western 
countries. Indeed, states have long had good strategic reasons 
to mislead and to confuse their adversaries, thus hiding evi-
dence of wrongdoing and deflecting blame. Intelligence is often 
a cat-and-mouse game that states play in the public sphere as 
well as in the private. In this case, offensive counter-intelligence 
operations serve to enhance deterrence because it helps fore-
stall unfavourable policy responses. Accordingly, Russia pro-
motes narratives that and cultivates politicians who resonate 
with voters who are disillusioned with the political status quo in 
their countries; adopts certain military tactics (e.g. ‘little green 
men’) to make externally-driven events appear indigenous; uses 
revelations of domestic surveillance programmes to delegiti-
mise Western institutions; and exploits the reluctance of some 
intelligence agencies to share information on possible Russian 
treaty violations.
Intelligence gathering and cooperation will no doubt continue 
among NATO members, including those in Western Europe. 
The incentives for collaboration are simply too strong and the 
history thereof too significant for it to be otherwise, but Russia 
cannot be expected to present itself as an easy target and so it 
uses creative means like disinformation to stymie intelligence 
and counter-intelligence efforts in the West and to create policy 
paralysis. It is thus essential for intelligence agencies in West-
ern Europe to be granted more resources from their national 
governments and to cooperate even more in order to prevent 
Russia from being successful in its divisiveness.
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